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I. 
STATEJWENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This is the second appeal of this case to this Court. In the original bench trial (the "first 
Proceeding''), Respondent Damian Farrell ("Farrell") sued Appellants Kent White1mm and his 
wholly-owned Michigan limited liability company, Whitehorse Properties, LLC ( collectively 
"Whiteman") for architect services Farrell rendered between 2002 and 2004 on Whiteman's West 
View Condominium project (the "Project") in Ketchum, Idaho. The district comi found an implied-
in-fact contract between Farrnll and Whiteman and awarded Fanell damages in quantum rneruit of 
$120,983 ft)r all services he rendered, reimbursement for expenses of S 13,408.58 Farrell incurred 
on Whiteman's behalf, attorney fees of $38,740 under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and costs of 
$7,547.20. 
On appeal, this Comi vacated the district court's award of damages and attorney fees and 
remanded for further consideration. (Farrell v. ·Whiteman et al., 146 Idaho 604, 613, 610 200 P .3d 
1153 (2009)). This Court found that because Farrell \Vas not licensed to practice architecture in 
Idaho until February 17, 2004, architectural services he rendered before that date were performed 
pursuant to an illegal contract and that any damages awarded up to that date must be measured by 
unjust enrichment, not quantum meruit. The district court was directed to determine whether or not 
Farrell had sustained damages in unjust enrichment for the illegal services and if so, in what amount. 
(Id., at 612-613). Since Farrell's legal and illegal services were "chronologically separable", this 
Court also directed the district court to dete1mine the reasonable value of services provided by Farrell 
in quantum meruit on and after February 17, 2004. (Id. at 611 ). This Court also found the district 
court ened in awarding attorney fees on an implied-in-fact contract which was, at 1 east unti 1 February 
17, 2004, illegal and left it to the district court to determine the fee issue on remand. 
References in this brief to the repo1ier' s transcript and the clerk's record in the first appeal 
will be designated as "Tr. I" and R. I", respectively. References to the reporter's transc1ipt and the 
clerk's record in the currci.1 appeal will be designated ''Tr. rr· and R. JI''. respectively. 
011 remand, the district court reopened this casc for additional evidence on 1he issue of 
damages and permitted additional c.fo,covcry. CR. Vol. II, pp. 10-1 I). On Sepkmbcr l 5, 2009, the 
district court he'.ll an cvidcntiary he,1ring at which further evidence ,vas presented for the district 
co Lui 's consideration. 
On January 6, 20 l 0, the district conrt issued its Decision on Remand finding Farrdl was not 
entitled to any architect's fee under an unjust enrichment theory prior to obtaining his Idaho license, 
but that he was entitled to reimbursement in unjust enrichment for pre-liccnsurc out of pocket 
expenses paid on Whitcman's hebalf ofSB.403.56 plns pre-judgment interest. (R. Vol. JI, pp. 89-
90). The district court also found F[m-ell \Vas entitled to a fee of $130,000 in quantum meruit for 
architectural services he rendered after receiving his Idaho license, some $9,000 more than he was 
awarded in the First Proceeding for all architectural services rendered both before and after he was 
licensed. 
Farrell then filed a claim for attorneys· fees and costs requesting re-award of all of the 
$38,740 in fees vacated by this Court in the first appeal. (R. VoL H, p. 98). Fa1Tel1 also claimed post-
remand attorneys' fees of an additional $14,025 together with costs of$7,735. (R. Vol. II, p. 98). 
Whiteman timely objected to Farrell's requests for foes and costs (R. Vol. II, pp. 118-125) and filed 
a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and To Stay Enforcement Proceedings. (R. Vol. II, pp. 
132-135). 
On April 30, 2010, the district cmni issued its Decision on Motions for Stay of Execution, 
To Alter and Amend Judgment, For Costs, and For Attorney Fees denying Whiteman's Motion to 
Alter and Amend Judgment and awarding Fam:11 $130,000 in architect's fees, $13,408.58 as 
reimbursement of expenses paid by Farrell, pre-judgment interest of $8,806.77 on those expenses, 
costs ofS?,734.70, a "re-award" of attorneys' fees ofS38,740 for legal services pcrfonned in the 
First Proceeding, and S 10,000 for post-remand attorneys' fees for a total judgment of $208,690.05. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 146-156). In May, 2010, the district court issued its First Amended Judgment on 
Remand. (R. VoL II, p. 157-158). Also in May, 20 IO, Whiteman filed a timely appeal of that 
2 
Judgrnent. Vol. II, 160-164). 
Statement 
1. Phases. The district corn-rs task on remand was to chronologically separate services 
rendered by Farrell before and after he was ltcensecl in Idaho, determine ,vhethcr or not FmTcll 
sustained damages m unjust enrichment for services rendered prior to February 17, 2004, and, if so, 
in ,vhat amount, and determine the quantum meruit recovery clue for services rendered by Farrell 
after he received his February 17, 2004, licensure. (Id, at 613 ). 
Farrell testified he did not keep track of how many hours he worked on the Project, that there 
were no documents or data from which he could calculate the hours he spent on the Project and that 
it would be impossible for him to estimate the number of those hours. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 369, LL 12-15; 
p. 370, LL 6-12). He also testified that the only ,vay he could compute the reasonable value of his 
services was to determine the percentage of the cost of the Project to which he was entitled and 
ascertain the work he did in each"phase" of the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 370, LL. 13-19). 
In both the First Proceeding and on remand, the district court found 5% ($212,950) of the 
cost of construction, reduced by certain expenses which were Farrell's responsibility but which had 
been paid by Whiteman, was an appropriate gross fee to use as a starting point in calculating 
Farrell's award. (R. Vol. II, p. 93). To determine the actual fee to which Farrell was entitled on 
remand, the district court was required to figure out when f a1Tell earned his fee by detennining what 
work Farrell did in the various phases of the Project. 
FaITell described the phases of the Project as: (1) a design phase, made up of a "schematic 
design" sub-phase ( consisting of designing and sketching) and a "design development" sub-phase 
(in which schematic design sketches are converted to detailed drawings from which actual 
construction drawings are produced), (2) a construction documents and bidding phase, where design 
development drawings are converted to construction drawings used to bid and build the Project, and 
(3) a construction observation phase consisting of site visits where the architect detennines that work 
3 
is being Ill wi1L <Tr. Vu1. I, p. 371, 
p. LL 1-25: p. 373, LL 1-25; p. 3 LL. 1-12). 
Farrell testified that in this particular Project, the ''schematic sub-phase and 
"design development'' sub-phase were not separate and distinct rather rolled into one "design 
phase" which began in the Spring of 2003 when Farrell did a feasibility study on the Project, 
researched Ketchum 's building re6'1.ilations, calculated grades and heights of buildings, made and 
refined preliminary sketches and drmvings and compiled the November, 2003, application few the 
first stage of the Ketchum Planning and Zoning Department's design review process for the Project. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, LL. 18-25; p. 25L LL. 1-10; p. 244, L. 25; p. 245, LL. 1-25; p. 246, LL. 1-25; p. 
247, LL. 1-25; p. 248, LL. 1-25; p. 249, LL. 1-8; p. 380, LL. 21-25; p. 38 l, LL. 1-10; p. 374, LL. 22-
25; p. 375, LL. 12-25; p. 376, LL. 1-9; p. 380, LL. 1-25; p. 381, LL. 1-10; p. 376, LL. 3-25; p. 264, 
LL. 1-13). After preparing and submitting the November, 2003, application, Farrell met with 
Ketchum officials, contractors and engineers and developed additional elevations and revised plans 
which were submitted to the Ketchum Planning and Zoning Department in February, 2004, for final 
approval of the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 403, LL. 9-12; p. 404, LL. 18-25; p. 405, LL. 21-25; p. 406, 
LL. 1-19; p. 3 86, LL. 13-21; p. 3 85, LL. 1-14; p. 3 82, LL. 4-9). Farrell testified that there "was a lot 
of work that went on [ in the schematic design phase] that you're not seeing" in the documents and 
plans submitted to the Planning and Zoning Department- that he was "trying the jigsaw puzzle" as 
he went. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 388, LL. 14-22). All of these services were rendered by Farrell before he was 
licensed in Idaho. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 384, LL. 1-25; p. 385, LL. 1-25; p. 386, LL. 1-25; p. 387, LL. 1-4). 
Therefore, on remand, the district cou1i found that all Farrell's work in the "schematic design" and 
"design development" phases of the Project occurred before FaiTell had his Idaho license. (R. Vol. 
II, p. 93). 
The construction documents and bidding phase was the second phase of the Project. It began 
1 Farrell's original architect services proposal to Whiteman (Ex. W505) described a fourth 
phase - "interior design" - but he later testified that it was "not really a phase as such". (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 372, LL. 11-18) 
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when the drawing:~ and plans subniittcd v:ith the- Novc:mhcL 200.t ,:ud FcL:·uar_',: 2004, Planning c:;Hl 
Zoning ~1pplications ,vere given to CDS, the drnftir:g serviCl' retained by Farrell at his expense to 
produce the plans for the Project, ~md SD[, the Project's structural engineers, who then began 
preparing the actt1al documents used to obtain a building pennit and build the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 279, LL. 18-20; p. 280, LL. 18-25; p. 281, LL. 1-4; p. 389, LL. 8-17; p. 39(l LL. 11-21; p. 391, 
LL. 5-25; p. 392, LL. 1-10). CDS immediately started generating the actual construction drawings 
and, although CDS was not making actual construction decisions on how the bt1ilding goes together, 
it was the entity in control of generating the plans themselves. (Tr. Vol. l, p. 391, LL. 5-25; p. 3 92, 
LL 1-21 ). The actual plans submitted to the Ketchum Building Department (the "Plans") for a 
building pennit and given to the contractor for construction purposes were therefore prepared by 
CDS at its office in Ketchum, Idaho. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 288, LL. 1-5, LL. 19-21). In preparing the Plans, 
CDS made electronic copies and emailed them to Farrell's Michigan office so Farrell could review 
them and email them back with any changes. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 294, LL 17-19). 
The constrnction documents and bidding phase was not completed by FaJTell. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
408, LL 23-25; p. 409, LL 1-5). Both Fanell and the architect who testified on Fa1Tel1 's behalf: Ned 
Hamlin ("Hamlin"), agreed that approximately 10% of the construction documents and bidding 
phase \Vas never completed. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 603, LL. 10-16; Exhibit W569). 
The construction observation phase was the third phase of the Project. Farrell perfonned no 
construction observation on the Project. (Tr. Vol. l, p. 408, LL 9-11). 
2. Percentage of Fee Earned in Each Phase. According to FaJTell, detennination of the 
amount of arcbitectural fees attributed to each phase is crucial to calculation of his fee. (Tr. I, p. 3 70, 
LL 13-19). Indeed, the percentage of fees earned in each phase and when work in each phase was 
perfonned are the two most important factors in detennining the amount to which Fanell is entitled. 
Fanell's own testimony in this regard is most instructive. 
In some of the most important testimony before the district court, Fan ell unequivocally stated 
that he would weight the time spent on the design phase ( consisting of both the "schematic design" 
5 
docu:ncnu and bidding phase. no1ing spenficnl!v th:,t on this Projcc1 th::y v:c,uiti be of sirn:i~u· 
wci2ht: 
Q: (Mr. Aanestad) Now, I understand from your prior testimony that you would 
weight the time spent on the design phase about the same as tirnt put into the 
documtnts phase? 
A: (,\1r. Farrell) Yes. It varies from project to project, but if you were to average 
it, they are of similar weight. 
Q: (Mr. Aanestad) They would be of similar weight in this project? 
A: (Mr. Farrell) Yes. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 407, LL. 17-25). 
He further testified that the final construction observation phase is between 15% and 20% 
of the total architectural effort put into the Project and that if it were 20%, then 40% of his time on 
the Project would have been spent in the design phase and 40% in the construction documents and 
bidding phase: 
Q: (Mr. Aanestad) And I also understand that the construction observation phase 
is generally about 20 percent of the total effort put into the project? 
A: (Mr. Fan-ell) Between 15 and 20 percent. 
Q: (Mr. Aanestad) So if it were 20 percent, then 40 percent of the time would be in 
the design phase and 40 percent of the time would be in the construction documents 
phase, roughly? 
A: (Mr. Farrell) Approximately. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 408, LL. 1-8). 
FaITell confirmed the range of these phase percentages by testifying that the construction 
documents phase represented "any\vhere from 40 to 50 percent of the work of an architect on a 
6 
iiffu: requirement of this phase he hired CDS to physically do the 
construction drawings while he oversaw their work (Tr Vol. T, p. 367, LL. 22-25). 
Fmrcil' witness Hamlin ~llso testified about these percentages, but his testimony was 
different and much less certain than that of Farrell. Concerning the percentages allocable to each 
phase, he testified that "[t]here really are no standards in our [architectural] practice." (Tr. Vol. L 
p. 593, L 9). He also testified that every architect "develops their own percentages" and that his 
(Hamlin's) percentage of the design phase was typically 15°/o of the overall fee. (Tr. Vol. L p. 593, 
LL l 1-14). He further testified that he could not attribute a percentage to the design development 
portion of the design phase in this Project because "[t]herc are no real definitions to it." (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 599, LL 18-25; p. 600, L. l ). He stakd that although Farrel! H'l/S able to specijicalzv define the 
design development sub-phase in this Project, he, Hamlin, could not tell how much "design 
development" was done on the Project (Tr. Vol. I, p. 635, LL. 1-8). Hamlin thought "design 
development" probably started as early as November of 2003, but he really did not know because 
he just did not "know how l Farrell] docs his business" and "l eJveryone does it different! y". (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 634, L 25; p. 635, LL. l-21 ). Hamlin was able to testify that ''design development" was done 
before the construction documents phase because "you really cannot develop your construction 
documents unless you perform design development". (Tr. Vol. I, p. 603, LL.1-2). 
Hamlin also attributed 70% offaiTell's fee to the construction documents and bidding phase. 
He admitted this was "a rough cstimate''and that it was just what he (Hamlin) used in percentage fee 
projects. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 662, LL. 17-21). He unequivocally stated that based on his 70% allocation 
to this phase and the time it took CDS to complete the Plans, Farrell would be entitled to 
approximately 570,000 per month for his work reviewing CDS' s electronic drafting from his 
Michigan office. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 662, LL. 1-16) He also testified that the construction documents 
appeared to him to be only 90% complete "on just a very cursory look" and based on discussions 
with Farrell, and that therefore FaJTell' s fee for this phase should be reduced by 10% of the 70% he 
allocated to it, qualifying his response by reiterating that "[t]here are no standards in architecture". 
(Tr.Vol. I, p. 667, LL 23-25; p. 668, LL 1-14). 
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\otc th'.•t Hm,dir,. cc,n:,'\:cnting on the imp:ic1 of lhc qzwiirr of Farr<'.'ll's work on the fee 10 
wliich he \'.a:-: entitled. kstificd that whether Farrl'll pcrfor;ncd "a good job or a bad job'' he was 
"absolutely'' entitled to the same percentage fee on the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 671, LL 16-25; p. 672, 
LL l-25; p. 673, LL. 1-S). 
Finally, Hamlin testified that he estimated approximately 15% of Fan-cll 's total fee was 
earned in thc:conslruction observation phase. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 665, LL. 20-23). In connection with this 
testimony 11c aclmi ttcd that the amount allocated to construction observation can vary from job to job 
and that }1e didn't know whether his 15°10 estimate was a standard used by other architects, since tbe 
on(v other architect he discussed percentages with \Vas his partner and that he did not "have any idea 
whal Mr. FaiTell's billing propensities (were)". (Tr. Vol. I, p. 665, LL 24-25; p. 666, LL 1-15). 
Hamlin's testimony concerning phase percentages is summarized on Defendants' Exhibit 
W569 attached hereto as Exhibit A. Tl1e typed portions of that exhibit were prepared by 
Whiteman's expert witness, architect Janet Jarvis ("Jarvis"), who testified to the accuracy of her 
entries. 2 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 690-703). Jarvis is licensed to practice architecture in six different states: 
Florida, Connecticut, Illinois, Wyoming, Montana and Idaho, served on the Ketchum Planning and 
Zoning Board for 2-3 years, and is a member of the American Institute of Architects. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
686, LL 12- l 9). The handwritten percentages, numbers and cross-outs on Exhibit A were made 
by Hamlin to indicate how he believed the percentages should be "redistributed". (Tr. Vol. I, p. 600, 
LL. 22-25; p. 601, LL. 1-15; p. 602, LL. 18-21). For example, where Ms. Jarvis attributed 40% of 
the total fee to the construction documents and bidding phase, Hamlin attributed 70%; where Ms. 
Jarvis estimated 20% to the construction observation phase, Hamlin attributed 15%. 
Hamlin testified that FatTell should be entitled to a gross fee of 5% on the Project. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 598, LL. 21-22). He also testified that at that percentage, the cost of CDS's drafting services 
and SDI's structural engineering fee would be the architect's responsibility and, since these were 
2 It should be noted that Jarvis' phase percentages are almost identical to those of Fan-ell. 
In pointing this out, Whiteman is not arguing that the district court should have adopted Jarvis' 
percentages over Hamlin's - only that there is additional support for FmTell's phase percentages. 
8 
F s (Tr. VoL I. p. 604, I 3-24; p. 
.l. F1::e Calculation in the First Procecdirn:i:. In the First Proceeding the district court 
essentially disregarded both Fan-ell's O\Vll testimony and the testimony Jan·is concerning the 
:1ttributable to each phase and adopted Hamlin's approach. It used 5% of the cost of the 
Project ($212,950) as an appropriate gross fee. It then reduced that mnount by the 15% (SJ 1,943) 
Hamlin attributed to construction observation because Farrell did no work in this phase, and l01~t 
(S 14,905) of the 70%i Hamlin attributed to the construction document and bidding phase, leaving an 
adjusted fee ofS 166,105. This amount was then reduced by CDS 's dratting fee (S32, 732) and SD I's 
structural engineering fee (S 12,390) leaving a net fee payable to Farrell for all architectural services 
rendered both before and q(ter his February 17, 2004, licensure date of S 120,983. (R. Vol. L p. 84). 
Ln the First Proceeding, there was no attempt by the district court to determine ,vhen Fanell became 
entitled to his fee. 
4. Fee Calculation On Remand. On remand, the district court concluded Farrell was 
entitled to 110 damages in unjust enrichment for services rendered prior to the time he obtained his 
Idaho architect's license but that he was entitled to S 13,408.58 in unrcimburscd expenses during that 
period and pre-judgment interest thereon. (R. II, pp. 89, 91 ). The court then found that for his post-
1 icensurc quantum mcruit recovery Farrell was entitled to more than he was awarded in the First 
Proceeding for all his services "because of the quality of his work" calculated as follows: (R. Vol. 
II, pp. 93-94) 
5% gross fee .......................................................... $212,950 
less 15% for both "schematic design" 
and "design development" phases ....................... ($31,942) 
less CDS fee ........................................ ($32,732) 
9 
less SDl 
/ I l . ' i' ess seconc arcutect s ee . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
Total Reductions ... . 
Total Award ....... . 
...... ( 
............. S 130,3 
. .... (S82,594) 
rounded to S 130,000 
In its calculation on remand, the district court neglected to reduce the by t11e i 5% 
allocated to the construction observation phase (which Farrell never performed) or by the 10%i of 
tl1e construction documents phase (vvhich Farrell didn't complete) as it had in the First Proceeding. 
The sum of those two amounts, using Hamlin's percentages, is $31,943 plus £14,905 for a total of 
$46,848. 
In awarding Farrell more on remand than in the First Proceeding, the district comi found 
"[t]bere is no requirement in the Supreme Court's decision that the award of damages goes lavver 
simply because of the timing of the application of two equitable remedies" (Tr. Vol. IL p. 87). 
5. Attorney Fees On Remand. This Comi vacated the district court's award of attorney 
fees in the First Proceeding finding 1l1at neither party was entitled to fees under Idaho Code § I 2-
120(3) "[e]ven when a party is permitted some recovery on an illegal transaction." (Farrell v. 
1Vhiteman, supra, at 613). It found the district comi erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Farrell 
based on an implied-in-fact contract which was, at least up until February 17, 2004, illegal. (Id.) 
Nonetheless, on remand, the district court awarded Farrell the full amount of all attorney fees 
awarded in the First Proceeding, $38,740, and $10,000 of the $14,025 in fees requested by Farrell 
for post-remand services, indicating it now based its fee award only upon "the legal portions of the 
contract". (R. Vol. II, p. 154). The court based its $4,025 reduction of Farrell's post-remand fees 
by finding them "excessive" rather than because they related to an illegal contract. (R. Vol. II, p. 
154). 
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IL 
ISSllES PRESENTED ON A.PPEAL 
Whcthcrtl1c district court erred in calculating the amounts O\ved to Farrell on rcnrnnd. 
Whether Farrell's phase percentages should be used rather than Hamlin's. 
2. Whether the district court should have reduced Farrell's mvard for work he did 
not do. 
3. Whether the quantum mcruit award to Farrell should he based on tbc reasonable 
\'aluc of his services, not on the speed and quality of his work. 
B. Whether the district court c1Tcd in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Farrell on 
remand. 
C. Whether Whiteman is entitled to award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and LC.§ 12-121. 
III. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the district court's rulings on equitable remedies for an abuse of 
discretion. ( Climax, LLC, v. Snake River Oncologv o.f Eastern Idaho, P.L.L. C, et al, 36613 
(IDSCCI) (October 6, 2010), citing O'Connor v. Harger, 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P .3d 846, 851 
(2008)) 
The standard of review for an abuse of discretion is "whether the court perceived the issue 
as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." (Id., citing Read v. Harvey, 14 7 Idaho 364, 369 209 P .3d 661, 666 (2009)). 
This Court may examine the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Luna, 35469 (IDS CCI) (September 
l l 
7, 201 ffl. citin_;An.;,J.s:r Trus: 1·. Wininger. 141 ld,1ho 570, 572, i ! 1~ P.3d l 28, 130 (2(K6). E-,,ickncc 
is rcgarckd ,:s :;ub:,tantd ifil rca:,onabk trier of f1ct \Ynuld 2ccept it ,md rely upon it in detcrmini11_\~ 
whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Id 
Detcrn;ining the meaning of an attorney-fee statute and whether it applies to the facts arc 
issues of law that this Court freely reviews. Smith 1·. Washington Coumy, Idaho, 35851 (IDSCCI) 
(October 6, 20 l Oi, citing JR. Simplot Co. v. W Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582,584, 977 P.2d 196, 
198 (1999). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Calculating the Amounts Due to Farrell. 
The district court only partially followed this Court's instructions on remand in computing 
the amount clue fancll. Its task was clear: Cbronologically scparak what architectural services were 
rendered by Farrell before and after he was licensed and determine (l) whether he is entitled to any 
unjust enrichment recovery for services rendered prior to liccnsurc and (2) the quantum meruit 
recovery due for services rendered thereafter. The district court did chronologically separate the 
services, findi11g the entire design phase (including both "schematic design" and "design 
development" sub-phases) of the Project was completed by Farrell before licensure. (R. Vol. 11, p. 
93 ). It also found Farrell was entitled to no recovery in unjust enrichment for that work. (R. Vol. 11, 
p. 90). But in determining the quantum meruit recovery to which Fan-ell was entitled for the legal 
portion of the implied-in-fact contract, the district comi ignored Farrell's own testimony concerning 
the percentage of work he completed on this Project in favor of the unce1iain, unsure testimony of 
Hamlin who testified only to the percentages he and his partner (but no other architects) did on other 
projects, that "everyone does l work in the design phase] differently", that he had no idea what Mr. 
Farrell's "billing propensities" were and that he just didn't "know how [Farrell] does his business". 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 635, LL. 1-21; p. 666, LL. 13-15). In so doing, the district comi awarded Farrell over 
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scJ.,000 it! f~~cs (a11(l over 
fot the nl!irc contrnd in 1hc First Pruccedint. 
it did ll(it reduce 1'arrcll's frc by 15'Y0 for construdion obs~rvri1kn v:liich Farrell did not perform 
tS>: .942) and j 0% of ihc co11struc1io:1 documc:1ts and bidding ph;:sc 1101 completed by Faffcll 
(S l ·i-,950). 
The dislrict court based its quantum mcruit award on the "positive results Farrell obtained 
because of the quality of his work" of which there is absolutely no evidence in the record and no 
basis in fact. (R. Vo 1. II, p. 93). The district court's foilurc in 1his regard was an abuse of its equitable 
discretion and is not supported by any substantial or competent evidence in this rnsc. 
1. Farrcll 's phase percentaf!CS should be used rather than Hamlin's. In calculating 
Farrell's fee, the district court used Ham] in 's fee percentages of l 5% for the design phase and 70% 
for the construction document phase. Fanell's own testimony concerning the percentages of his 
services attributable to each phase of this specific Project should ensily trump Hamlin's uncertain 
estimates of lrnw he attributed phase percentages in his practice. Time and time again Hamlin's 
testimony was qualified by hi.-, statements that he did not know how much work Fanell performed 
in each phase, and could only testify as to his (Hamlin's) practices. Farrell unequivocally testified 
that he would weight the time spent on the design phase (i.e. the combined schematic design and 
design development sub-phases) "about the same" as that spent on the constrnetion documents 
phase, specifically and emphatically noting that 011 this particular Project they would be of similar 
weight. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 407, LL 17-25). He also testified that the schematic design and design 
development sub-phases were really rolled into one integrated design phase (Tr. Vol. I, p. 388, LL. 
3-25), and that all design documents were prepared by him prior to Ii censure. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 384, LL. 
1-25; p. 385, LL. 1-25; p. 386, LL. 1-25; p. 387, LL. 1-4). He testified that his construction 
observation phase was typically between 15-20% of the total architectural fee, and that if it were 
20%, then approximately 40% of his time would have been spent on the design phase and 
B 
LL!-:~). He cunfirm~·d 
this estimate ii; scparak· tcs1in;t),:y \':he,, he indicated the C(1;1sLn:ct1m~ documents ph:1:::c \Vas 
"typirnlly tnyv.:hcrc frorn -'lO to 50 percent of the wo3: of nn architect un (: project". (Tr. Vol. r, p. 
363, LL. 1 -4). 
It is especially important to focus on Hamlin's vier'/ of F<1rrcll 's design development sub-
phase on the Project. Hamlin was hesitant and unable to testify to the amount of design development 
performed by Farrell in the design phase because "it is very diffiClllt to define'' and "everyone docs 
it differently". (Tr. Vol. J, p. 634, LL. 25: p. 635, LL. 1-13) He admits that Farrell was able to 
specifically define the design development sub-phase in this Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 635, LL. 1 ). But 
he indicated th:it in his practice design development didn't end until "somewhere in the construction 
documents phase [and is] overlapping" (Tr. Vol. L p. 643, LL. 10-15). This is directly contrary to 
Farrell's testimony and noteworthy because Hamlin's allocation of design development to the 
"construction documents" phase explains his 70% allocation to this phase as opposed to the 40% to 
50% allocakd by Farrell. The work Farrell performed after receiving his license was all done in the 
construction documents phase: He is entitled to an award in quantum meruit for that work only. That 
is why an accurate analysis of this phase is absolutely crucial to an accurate mvarcl. 
The di.strict court um~quivocally found all work Farrell did in the design phase ~ the 
"schematic design" and "design development" subphases ~ occurred before Farrell was licensed. (R. 
Vol. 11, p. 93 ). This is in accord with Farrell's own testimony that both "schematic design" and 
"design development" were essentially rolled into one phase. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 388, LL 12-13, 23). But 
the district court then applied Hamlin's 15% allocation to the design phase, not appreciating that in 
Hamlin's practice this did not include all the design development \.Vhich Hamlin found so difficult 
to define. Applying Hamlin's allocation is in direct conflict with FaJTell's testimony that the 
percentage of architect's work in the construction documents phase of this Project was about the 
same as the percentage of work in the design phase. The district court en-ed in using Hamlin's 70% 
allocation because it didn't understand that he got there because he attributed his design development 
efforts largely to the construction documents phase. It should have used the percentage to which 
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F:-srel! Uf"!\\'av..:ringly tc:stificc1. 
On remand, the district court ~:h,:i-uld h:'.\·c rcduc~·ci tl~,~ g;-c,s:S kc ($212,050) by 15% 
(SJ LtJ4J) to reflect tlnt Farrc·ll rendered no servict:s in the: final ''conslruction observation plwsc··· 
resulting in an adjw;tcd frc: of S 181,007 t,l b..:: allocated between the dcsigr, phase and the 
construction documents and bidding ph~sc, or $9(\504 each. Since the district court found Fnm:11 
is entitled to no ~rward in unjust enrichment for his prc--liccnsure work in the design phase, Farrell 
is left 1vvith $90.504 in fees for his ''construction documents and bidding phase''. This amount is 
properly reduced by l 0% ($9,050) for work which Farrell did not perform in this phase, leaving a 
fee of S8] ,454. This amount should be fu1thcr reduced by the CDS fee ($32,732) and the SDI 
structural engineer's fee (S 12,390), just as the district court did in the First Proceeding, since these 
costs wonlcl be tbc architect's responsibility in a 5% fee but were paid by Whiteman. This results 
in an award to Fandl of $36)32 as the reasonable value of the architectural services he rendered 
during the "construction documents phase'' on and after February 17, 2004. It bears emphasizing 
that this amount is based 1111011 the unequivocal, undisp1lfed testimony ofForrell himse{/in these 
proceedings. There is no better t.;Vidence available to this Court to chronologically separate the 
quantum mcruit recovery due Farrell for services rendered after he became licensed from the services 
n::ndercd prior to liccnsurc for which the district court found no unjust enrichment recovery. 
2. The District Court Should Have Reduced Farrell's Award By Work He Did Not Do. 
Even if the district court were correct in using Hamlin's percentages rather than FaITell's, the 
calculation of the $130,000 award to Farrell is incorrect. On remand, the district court awarded 
Farrell a quantum meruit fee calculated by reducing the gross fee of 5% ($212,950) only by the 15% 
attributable to services rendered by Farrell in the design phase before licensure ($31,942) and fees 
paid to CDS (S32,732), SDI ($12,390) and the second architect's fee (55,530) to get to the $130,000 
award. (R. Vol. II, p. 93-94). 
Under any theoryofrecovery, Farrell should not be compensated in quantum meruit for work 
he did not do. Whiteman does not agree with the percentages used by the district court in computing 
[5 
eve:, the district court in the First Prncccding ind· th:111 c,C5. (S212.950J sho'c1lcl 
(S3 J ,9-1::) fiJr construction observation which Farrell cliJ not perform rmci I 0% 
(SI 4,950) of tl1c construction documents phase \Yhich Farrell did not complete wliich would result 
in a total award of $88,993. To be consistent with the methodology used hy the district court on 
remand, this award should be further reduced by the amount paid to the second architect ($5,530), 
for a total mvard of S83,4(i3, although this reduction was not made in calculating the award in the 
First Proceeding. 
,., 
.) . The Quantum Meruit Award to Farrell Should Be Based on the Reasonable Value of 
His Services. Not on the Perceived "Oualitv of His \Vork''. lt is well settled in Idaho that the 
measure of recovery for a claim in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of services rendered, not 
the actunl benefit realized and retained. (Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934 P.2d 951 (Idaho 
App 1997), citing Peavy 1'. Pel!andini, 97 Idaho (i55, 660,551 P.2d 610,615 (1976)). This is 
supposed to be nn objective measure proven by evidence demonstrating the nature of the work and 
the customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was perfonncd. (Id.). 
Yet in calculating the Sl30,000 award to FmTell on remand, the district comi emphasized that the 
greater award was due in large part to the speed and quality of Farrell's work (R. Vol. II, pp. 92, 93, 
86, 148) based largely on the court's finding that the units in the Project ''sold for prices ref1ecting 
both the quality of Farrell's work and the speed with which he gets his work done''. (R. Vol. II, p. 
148). Whiteman submits there is not a single shred of evidence that any unit in the Project sold 
because of Farrell's design or the speed at which he worked. There was absolutely no testimony 
whatsoever from anyone in support of that finding. Whether units sold because of their location, 
views, quality of constrnction and finish work, pricing, sun exposure, or any of a variety of other 
factors influencing a buyer's decision is pure speculation since there is nothing in the record to 
support any of these theories. Indeed, it is equally plausible that the units sold in spite of the design 
rather than because of it Neither Hamlin nor FmTell argued that Farrell's fee should be increased 
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or quality bis work. contrary, Hamlin testified that Farrell would 
entitled to the SCimc \vhcther lie performed a "good job or lx,d job or whether it \Vas timely or not 
, , , I 
r. vol. , p. 1, 7-25: p. 2, · p. 673, . i ). district court' fi 
nm to this testimony. 
Calculations. aid this Court in calculating the proper amount clue Farrell, 
\.Vhitcm::m the follcnving summary the calculations described above in chart form: 
(see next page) 
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PE.RCENTAGE FEE SUM.MARY 
F nrrc-li's ·r l~stirnony Hamiin's Testimony Dist. Ct.'s Award Dist. Ct.'s Award l\lath Proposed 
re: l'lw•-c Pcrce11,,1g0s res: Ph:isc i11 the First On R(Jmant! Cc,1-r('Clion to Dist. CL 
Pcrct'lit:1gtis I'rnceeding for All (Ilamlin's '%, Dist. Ct.', Aw;ird 
Work without reduction Award On (Farrell's 
for work Fnrrell Remand o;., _,vit!! 
did not do) (Ifamlin's 0/., rednc(ion 
with reduction for work 
for work Farrell did 
Farrell did not nut clo) 
do) 
% Amount ,{~ Amount Of /0 Amount •;., Amount ~{; Amount Amount 
Design Ph,1s, 40%- S35,180 - 15°/4 S31,943 I ,o, J /0 $31,943 15% 0 15% 0 0 
(Schematic 42.5% S\l0,50,t 
Design and (equal tu 
Design Constr. 
Dcveloplllcnl) Docs 
Phase) 
Constr. Docs 40%- SSS,180- 70°1.; $149,065 70% $)49,065 70% $149,065 70% $149,065 $85,180-
Phase 42.5% S90,504 $90,504 
(equal to 
design 
pliasc); 
also 
~40. 
50~-'o'' 
Con,tr. 15%- () 15%, 0 15% 0 15% S31,943 15% 0 0 
Observation 20% 
Phase 
(never 
performed} 
Rcductio11s 
l0% of Const ($8,518 - ($14,905) ($14,905) 0 ($ I 4,905) ($8,518-
Docs Phase not S9,050) $9,050} 
compklcd 
Drafting Service ($32,732) ($32.732) ($32,732) ($32,732} ($32,732} ($32,732) 
(CDS) 
Structmal (Sl2,390} ($12,390) ($12,390) ($12,390) (Sl2,390) ($12,390) 
Engineer (SDI) 
2".! Architect 0 0 0 ($5,530) ($5,530) 0 
(Barkley) 
TOTAL NET $II 6,720 • S120,983 S120,983 $130,355 S83,508 $ 148,663-
FEE FOR ALL $126,836 SI 69,426 
WORK 
Award After $31,540 - S89,038 NIA $130,000 $83,508 $31,540-
Liceusure (No $36,332 $36,332 
Design Phase) 
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In 1he First 
under LC. ~ i 1 :~OU,), citing Bony 1·. Pac. W Consrr., !nc. 1 140 Idaho 827, 835 103 P.3c1440, 44S 
(2004). Under Htmy, even when a party i:i permitted some recovery on an illegal transaction, the 
CGLd cannot mv;:ird attorney fres under LC. § l :2-120(3). Therefore, this Court found the district 
court en-eel in awarding attorneys fees to Farrell based on an implied-in-fact contrad which was, at 
least until February 17, 2004, illegal. 
On remand, the district court again awarded the full $38,740 in attorneys fees innmed by 
Farrell in the First Proceeding and awarded him an additional£ 101000 in attorneys fees incurred in 
connection with the rehearing proceedings on remancL all pursuant to J.C. 12-120(3). In making this 
award, the district court concluded that "the request for fees f1-om Farrell is based upon his recovery 
of the 'legal' po1tions of his contract". (R. Vol. II, p. 152). There is nothing in the record to support 
that Farrell made such a request. Farrell's counsel's afiidavit in support of his attorney fee request 
(R. Vol. II, pp. l 01 114) 111c1kcs no attempt to attribute fees to only the "legal" portion of the 
implied-in-fact contract. Rather, it simply requests payment of all fees incurred for the entire pre-
appeal services and for all 3ttorncys fees incurred on remand without any distinction between legal 
and illegal p011ions of'thc contract or any attempt at chronological separation. Nor is there anything 
in the record to support the district court's conclusion that all Fanell's fees were related only to the 
legal p011ions of his contract Indeed, much of the discovery and testimony at the First Proceeding 
focused on ,vhat FmTell did prior to licensure in order to segregate the clearly illegal portion of the 
contract from the arguably legal. (See, e.g., Exhibits \V501-W538; W569 Ex. I and 2; Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 223-438; pp. 590-684; pp. 62-149). 
The district court also relied upon Blimka v. My Web VVholesaler, LLC, ( 143 Idaho 723, 152 
P.3d 598 (2008)) in making its attorney fee award under LC. § 12-120(3), emphasizing that it 
antedated all three cases cited by this Comi in its vacation of the prior fee award. Blimka was 
decided in 2007 in an opinion \Vritten by Justice J. Jones, the same Justice who wrote the 2009 
opinion in the first appeal of this case. It is hard to imagine that this Court and counsel would ignore 
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irnnsac;io:-i" grom1tl in Jdalio Cc,ck § 1 120(3 ). It ks to do with rccc·vci·y of fec.s under m-. 
implied-in-fact contract which is part legal and pan illcg~1!, and it offer:~ absolutely no support for 
or against an mvard of attorneys fees in that situation. For the district court to conclude that the legal 
portion of Farrell's implied-in-fact contract qualifies a·:; a ''commercial tran~;action" is fin-::: to use 
that conclusion to justify an award of ell Farrell's $48,740 in attorneys fees is not. 
The district court concluded that under Bcmy, only if the contract is illegal in its entirety arc 
the parties precluded from claiming attorneys fr.'.es under I.C. § 12-120(3). A strong argument can 
be made that Farrell is not entitled to any atromey fees at all under the Bany rationale because 
Farrell had no ability to contract or enter into an enforceable commercial transaction - he was 
unlicensed when the implied-in-fact contract cormnenced and therefore incapable of contracting for 
architect services. However, ifattomey fees are di sallowed under Barr}' only fi)r the illegal portions 
of the contract at the very most there should be a proration between the legal and illegal portions. 
In v,icating the prior fee award, this Court Ici1 it to the district court to determine the fee issue on 
remand. (Farrell v. Whiteman, supra, at 6 l3). To the extent this Comt's decision calls for an 
allocation of fees between the legal and illegal portions of the contract, a reasonable formula should 
be applied. Using Farrell's percentages of design phase ( 40% ), construct ion documents phase ( 40%) 
and construction observation phase (20%) would result in an award of 40% of fees claimed in the 
First Proceeding since services in the design phase \Vere illegal and the construction observation 
phase was never performed. Using the proportion the maximum recove1y Whiteman proposes 
($36,332) bears to the gross fee ($212,950) results in an award of 17% of fees claimed in the First 
Proceeding. 
Concerning the fee award for the post-remand proceedings, Whiteman contends FmTell is 
entitled to no fees because he did not prevail. The district court's charge on remand \Vas to 
determine what, if any, unjust enrichment recovery was due Farrell for the illegal portion of his 
contract. The district courtfound he was entitled to no ur1fust enrichment recove,y. (R. Vol. II, 90). 
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unjust enrichment? 
FaJTell h,:d full opportunity 0:1 remand to pre.sen! wh:1:...:VL'r addilionnl C\'ickncc he foought 
was consistent with the appellak opinion of this Court. (R. Vol. IL p. J 0). He foiled lo present any 
evidence of unjust enrichment rei.'.overy or any evidence in support of an award of attorneys fees 
attributabk to the legal portion of the contract. Farrell has had his second bite at 1hi; apple. Since 
he made no effort to justify an award ('f cveu a portion of tile attorney fees ,·acatccl by this Court, the 
foe a\vanl by the district cou1i shou:d be vacated, or, in foe alternative, prorated as discussed above. 
C. \Vhit(·man is Entitled to Attornev Fees and Costs On Appeal. vVhiteman 
requests attorneys fees on appeal under 1.C. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54( e)( I). Under that statute and 
rule, reasonable attorneys foes will be awarded to a prevailing party when the Corni is letl with the 
abiding belief that the appeal was defended frivolously, unnecessarily and without foundation. 
(Stewart v. 5·1ewort, 143 Idaho 673,681, 152 P.3d 544,552 (2007)) 
Whiteman's appeal is based in large part upon indisputable en-ors of omission in the district 
court's damages calculation. Farrell is not entitled to pay1ncnt for work he did not do. This ineludes 
the approximately $31,942 portion of the fee attributable to the construction observation phase in 
which be rendered no services (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 408, LL. 9-11) and the $14,950 portion of the fee 
attributable to the 10°/4) of the construction documents phase he never completed. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 408, 
LL. 23-25; p. 409, LL. 1-5; p. 667, LL. 23-25; p. 668, LL. 1-14). Neither Farrell, Hamlin, nor any 
other witness at trial testified that FmTell was entitled to these amounts. These omissions are 
tantamount to arithmetic e1Tors, and should not be included in a quantum meruit award based on the 
reasonable value of services rendered. Fan-ell should have come forward when this appeal was 
filed, agreed to the math e1Tor and stipulated that at least this approximately $65,000 issue be 
removed from dispute. Rather, Fan-ell insisted on defending this obvious enor and the other 
decisions of the district court described above which are wholly unsupported by any substantial and 
competent evidence. \Vhiteman should therefore be awarded his attorneys' fees in bringing this 
21 
apped I' defense is fri \\ 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court engaged in sleight-of-hand in finding that although Fam.:ll was entitled to 
no pre-1icensurc unjust cnricbrnent recovery, he was entitled to a greater overali fee than that 
awarded to 11i111 in the First Proceeding for al1 his \\'Ork. The percentages the district court attributed 
to the various architectural phases ignore FmTcll 's O\Vn testimony 8S to what he did on this Project 
in favor of Hamlin's unceriain, hedging testimony of what he would do in a percentage-of-cost 
contract. Hamlin's testimony hardly rises to the standard of substantial and competent evidence in 
light of Farrell's undisputed testimony. 
The district court's calculation also awards Fmrell quantum meruit recovery for the 
construction observation phase which he did not perform and for 10% of the construe-ti on documents 
phase which he did not complete. Under any theory of recovery Farrell is not entitled to 
compensation for work he did not do. Farrell himself and his witness, Hamlin, testified that Farrell 
rendered no services in these areas; there was no evidence~ none that Farrell was entitled to 
compensation for this work. 
The district court indicates that because "[t]his is, aner all, an award made in equity" it is free 
to cut Farrell's award out of whole cloth without regard to whether there is substantial, competent 
or any other evidence to support the award. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 149). Its finding that Farrell is entitled 
to more money because of the speed and quality of his work is wholly unsupported by any evidence. 
The measure of recovery required for a claim in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of services 
rendered~ this is an objective standard to be proven by evidence demonstrating the customary pay 
for such work in a similar community. The district court's judgment is erroneous and should be 
vacated with explicit instructions from the Court as to the exact amount of any award to FaJTell 
without further detennination by the district court. Based on Farrell's own testimony, that award 
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\'1:cateJ bcc:n:sc 11:e fee:, rcst;lte:ci frur:. an implit:ci-in-fact contract that w~ts il!cg::l at tlic.: time it wa:: 
cntcn::d into. In the alterna:ive, this Court should prorate any such fees based on the percentage of 
work for which an award is rnadc ns discussed :ibove. This Court should vacntc the' fees awarded 
for post-rcm~nd proc(:edings since Lirrdl did 1101 succeed in prnving entitlement to any unjust 
enrichment award. 
FaITcll 's defense of the district court's judgment, especially its cmmcous mvard to Farrell for 
the work he did not perform in the construction observation phase and 1hc constructio;1 documents 
phase was unreasonable and without foundation, and \Vhiteman should be awarded attorneys' fees 
on appeal under LC§ 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(c)(I). 
DATED this !V 't..··· day of Movq.tUti/' , 2010. 
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